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Abstract: Certain kinds of urban areas may become increasingly
common for armed conflict in the 21st century. However, current
notions that the megacity will emerge as a primary battlespace for
advanced armies is an unproven hypothesis. US strategists need to
avoid rushing to replace population-centric counterinsurgency with
a paradigm of population-centric megacity operations. A preferable
path is to develop a long-term and systematic interdisciplinary urban warfare lens based on careful research and analysis that is both
historically informed and future-oriented.
It has generally proved easier to demonstrate that defense has played an important role in
many aspects of the city than to show that the city has played a role in military science.
~ G. J. Ashworth, War and the City (1991)

O

ne of the major weaknesses of recent American strategy
is its relative neglect of an urban imperative. The study of
urban warfare continues to remain little more than a sub-field
of strategic studies with a literature largely unrelated to the world of
contemporary security policy.1 For these reasons, it is a great pity the
publication of the US Army’s June 2014, Megacities and the United States
Army: Preparing for a Complex and Uncertain Future is such a disappointing
attempt to invigorate the relationship between strategy and the city.2 The
report’s central premise that megacities – defined as cities with populations over ten million – now represent “the epicenters of human activity
on the planet and, as such, they will generate most of the friction which
compels future military intervention” is a selective interpretation of the
highly complex process of 21st century global urbanization. Moreover,
the suggestion that the scale of megacities “defies the military’s ability to
apply historical methods” and therefore is “fundamentally a new operating environment to which the Army must shape itself and discover
new approaches” is exaggerated. Such a view overlooks the continuing
value of a body of post-Cold War military research, some of which was,
ironically, commissioned by the US Army itself. A final flaw in Megacities
and the United States Army is its typology, which by focusing mainly on
a systems-analysis methodology illuminates the document’s neglect of
1      For discussion, see Michael Evans, “Lethal Genes: The Urban Military Imperative and
Western Strategy in the Early Twenty-First Century,” Journal of Strategic Studies 32, no. 4 (August
2009): 515-552, and Michael Evans, City Without Joy: Urban Military Operations into the 21st Century,
Occasional Paper No. 2 (Canberra: Australian Defence College, 2007).
2      Chief of Staff of the Army, Strategic Studies Group, Megacities Concept Team, Megacities and
the United States Army: Preparing for a Complex and Uncertain Future (Arlington, VA: Office of the Chief
of Staff of the Army, June 2014).
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relevant research material on cities emanating from the long-established
field of urban studies.3
In light of the above weaknesses, this article argues the US Army
would be ill-served to concentrate overly on megacities as a primary
strategic environment for three further reasons. First, megacities are not
necessarily the principal urban areas in which American forces may be
called upon to fight in the future. Rather, middleweight and smaller cities
remain just as likely to provide important operational environments in
the years ahead. Second, megacities are not sui generis; they do not represent a novel military phenomenon. The military processes of operating
in any city are drawn from fundamentals of urban warfare tried and
tested by land forces since at least the middle of the twentieth century.
Future technological developments notwithstanding, most fundamentals of urban warfare are likely to remain relevant for general-purpose
forces even in a conglomeration on the scale of a megacity. Third, the US
Army needs to embed the study of megacities into a rigorous program
of long-term urban war research that is both interdisciplinary in theory
and interagency in practice. Such a program must systematically integrate military concerns with relevant aspects of municipal management,
urban geography, and city planning.

Cities as Strategic Sites: The Growing Importance of the
Middleweight City

In terms of demographic disposition, the greatest revolutionary
shift of the first quarter of the twenty-first century is the movement
of people from countryside to city. In 2007, half the world passed the
benchmark of fifty percent of its population being located in urban areas
while urban demography now grows at some 65 million every year – a
breakneck rate of speed equivalent to the creation of seven new Chicagos
annually.4 Not surprisingly, the urban revolution has spawned a debate
on the meaning of this transition for the world’s future economic structure and geopolitical stability.5 For some analysts, mass urbanization
is a prescription for growing anarchy, violent political breakdown, and
ecological decline in the developing world. Pessimists foresee a coming
era of “feral cities” in which conflict will be “crowded, connected and
coastal” and occur in failed megalopolises from Karachi and Dhaka in
Asia, to Kinshasa and Lagos in Africa.6

3      Ibid., 4-5, 8-9.
4      Shlomo Angel, Planet of Cities (Cambridge: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2012) and
McKinsey Global Institute, Urban World: Mapping the Economic Power of Cities, March 2011, www.
mckinsey/insights/urbaniztion/urban_world, and McKinsey Global Institute, Urban World: Cities
and the Rise of the Consuming Class, June 2012, www.iberglobal.com/Archivos/MGI-Urban-world.
5      See special report: “Metropolis Now,” with notable articles by Parag Khanna, “Beyond City
Limits: The Age of Nations Is Over: The New Urban Era Has Begun,” Foreign Policy, no. 181
(September/October 2010): 122-28; Joel Kotkin, “Urban Legends: Why Suburbs Not Cities are the
Answer,” Foreign Policy, no. 181 (September/October 2010): 128-131; and Joel Kotkin, et. al., The
Problem with Megacities (Orange, CA: Chapman University Press, 2014), www.chapman.edu/wilkinson/_files/MegaCities; Roy Woodbridge, The Next World War: Tribes, Cities, Nations and Ecological
Decline (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 78.
6      Richard J. Norton, “Feral Cities,” Naval War College Review 56, no. 4 (Autumn 2003): 97-106;
Roy Woodbridge, The Next World War: Tribes, Cities, Nations and Ecological Decline (Toronto: University
Press of Toronto, 2004), 78-80; David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban
Guerrilla (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), chapter five.
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While such a dystopian future is certainly a possibility for some nonWestern cities, much urban studies research tends to view the transition
from a rural to an urban world as one of the twenty-first century’s most
positive developments since it will drive economic growth and social
mobility. Urbanization is seen by many scholars as a solution to alleviating long-term poverty and political instability in regions from Asia
through Latin America to some parts of the Middle East and Africa.7 It
is important to note that over 40 percent of urbanization is occurring
in Asia, particularly in China and India. As Richard Dobbs has noted,
“the new era of cities will actually be the era of Asian cities.”8 By 2025,
1.6 billion Asians – 50 percent of the global total will live in cities; nine
of the world’s wealthiest twenty-five cities will be in Asia with Shanghai
and Beijing expected to outrank Los Angeles and Paris, while Delhi and
Bangkok will come to surpass Detroit and Barcelona. By the late 2020s,
some $30 trillion, or 65 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP),
will be generated by some six hundred cities, over a third of which will
be in the developing world.9
A crucial point for US military strategists to grasp is most projected
urban growth in the developing world is not centered on a few megacity
“population bombs,” but on a far more dispersed grouping of diverse
middleweight cities whose populations range from between 150,000 to
ten million.10 In 2011, the McKinsey Global Institute, a leading authority on global urbanization, observed:
Contrary to common perception, megacities have not been driving global
growth for the past 15 years. In fact, many have not grown faster than
their host economies and we expect this trend to continue. We estimate that
today’s 23 megacities will contribute just over 10 per cent of global growth
to 2025, below their 14 percent share of global GDP today . . . Instead we
see the 577 fast-growing middleweights in the City 600 contributing half of
global growth to 2025, gaining share from today’s megacities.11

In 2012, McKinsey further identified an “Emerging 440” cities
grouping projected to generate 47 percent of global growth, or $17.7 trillion to 2025 and beyond. Significantly, of this number, only twenty are
categorized as megacities with the remainder being middleweight urban
centers. Of these middleweights, over 200 are in China; fifty more are
located in Latin America; while 39 are found in Africa and the Middle
East. In many of these middleweight cities, growth is driven less by
population density than by per capita GDP; the size of households actually tends to decline in many developing cities even while the number of
households actually rises.12
7      See for example, Saskia J. Sassen, ed, Cities in a World Economy (Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge
Press, 4th Ed., 2011); Joel Kotkin, Cities: A Global History (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2005),
part six; Neil Brenner and Roger Keil, eds., The Global Cities Reader (New York: Routledge, 2006).
8      Richard Dobbs, quoted in Susan Glasser, “Letter From the Editor,” Foreign Policy, no. 181
(September/October 2010): 1, emphasis in original.
9      McKinsey Global Institute, Urban World: Mapping the Economic Power of Cities, 17-20; 27-28; 30;
and McKinsey Global Institute, Urban World: Cities and the Rise of the Consuming Class, 1.
10      P. H. Liotta and James F. Miskel, The Real Population Bomb: Megacities, Global Security and the Map
of the Future (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2012), 9.
11      McKinsey Global Institute, Urban World: Mapping the Economic Power of Cities, 4.
12      McKinsey Global Institute, Urban World: Cities and the Rise of the Consuming Class, 5-6; 19, and
Mathew Burrows, The Future Declassified: Megatrends that Will Undo the World Unless We Take Action,
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 89-90.

36

Parameters 45(1) Spring 2015

Contrary to the US Army’s 2014 report, over the next ten to fifteen
years, it is by no means inevitable that “megacities will be the strategic
key terrain in any future crisis that requires US military intervention.”13
Instead, the real magnets for urbanization are a “new breed of vigorous middleweights.” For example, over the next decade, the thriving
textile city of Surat in India and the Nigerian oil refining center of Port
Harcourt are likely to become more important than megacities such as
Mumbai or Lagos.14 None of this means new megacities will not develop
from fast-growing middleweights – such as Chennai in India, Lahore in
Pakistan, Tianjin and Shenzhen in China, or simply emerge from scratch
in a “blank slate” high-technology or “smart city” approach.15
However, the point for military strategists to grasp is that, in terms
of long-term demographic migration, household size and income distribution, it is the maze of middleweight cities that are poised to be
the key urban sites for the next two decades. An alternative structure
of urbanization is rapidly emerging, and as the leading social scientist,
Saskia J. Sassen, has pointed out, what really matters when analyzing
cities is less their demographic size than their politico-economic influence both regionally and globally.16 In terms of such influence many
middleweight cities are likely to become as strategically important as
megacities and may even eclipse the latter in terms of economic power
and geopolitical significance. By 2025, middleweight-city share of global
GDP is expected to jump from 15 to 45 percent and their populations
will grow from 430 million to 1.5 billion.17 Referring to West Africa,
the McKinsey Global Institute notes, “we expect large middleweights
and some small middleweights to outperform the region’s largest city
of Lagos.”18
While some writers, such as P. H. Liotta and James F. Miskel, view
megacities as unprecedented phenomena, “overwhelmed, dangerous,
ungovernable . . . unlike anything the earth has ever seen,” other analysts are more skeptical.19 As the urban specialist, Joel Kotkin, argues,
“the rise of the megacity is by no means inevitable and it might not
even be happening.” He points to the evolution of more dispersed urban
migration in the developing world based on diversity rather than concentration.20 It is certainly true that recent patterns of city development
are distinguished less by centralization than by decentralized clusters
and networks such as those around the metropolis of Shanghai in the
Yangtse River Delta in China.21 Sprawling megacities such as Mumbai,
Lagos and Dhaka may well be shambolic, poverty stricken, and crimeridden, but these features do not necessarily make them centers for
future military crises. As Jonathan Kalan points out, given the variations
13      Chief of Staff of the Army, Strategic Studies Group, Megacities and the United States Army, 5.
14      McKinsey Global Institute, Urban World: Cities and the Rise of the Consuming Class, 48.
15      Burrows, The Future Declassified, 89-90.
16      Saskia J. Sassen, “The Urban Complex in a World Economy,” International Social Science Journal
46, no. 1 (February 1994): 43-62; Kotkin, The Problem with Megacities, 17.
17      McKinsey Global Institute, Urban World: Mapping the Economic Power of Cities, 14-17; 28-31.
18      Ibid., 31.
19      Liotta and Miskel, The Real Population Bomb: Megacities, Global Security and the Map of the Future, 7.
20      Kotkin, “Urban Legends: Why Suburbs Not Cities are the Answer”,131, and Kotkin, et al,
The Problem with Megacities, 16-17.
21      McKinsey Global Institute, Urban World: Mapping the Economic Power of Cities, 10-11; and
McKinsey Global Institute, Urban World: Cities and the Rise of the Consuming Class, 20-21.
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at play in global urbanization, we need to beware simplistic representations of megacities as “the looming development crisis of this century.”22
On closer examination, megacities such as Mumbai, which appear to
Westerners to be fragile tinderboxes, may prove to be far more complex,
resilient, and functional when judged in terms of their indigenous dynamics. For example, despite its poverty and slum living, Mumbai, scene
of a devastating seaborne-terrorist attack by Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) in
2008, has sought to focus on increasing social mobility by developing
decentralized municipalities and promoting surburbanism. Moreover,
Mumbai contributes six percent to India’s GDP despite having only 1.5
percent of the national population.23 Similarly, Dhaka in Bangladesh,
reputedly “the least livable city on the planet,” has a per capita GDP
three times that of the average Bangladeshi peasant and is, in national
terms, relatively prosperous.24 Finally, we should remember a city in
crisis in one era is not necessarily doomed to a dystopian future. A good
example is Medellin in Colombia which, in the 1980s and 1990s approximated a failed city dominated by drug lords, vast criminal networks
and socio-political alienation. In the second decade of the twenty-first
century, Medellin has transformed itself by reforming a civic leadership
that overhauled policing and developed an innovative urban infrastructure program which increased the size of its middle class and reduced its
murder rate by sixty percent.25
For the US Army, some cities may well become future operating
environments. However, the idea that megacities will become a primary
strategic environment for American land power is, to date, an unproven
hypothesis. It may be an uncomfortable truth for the authors of Megacities
and the United States Army, but in the years ahead megalopolises may be
of far less strategic significance than clusters of decentralized, middleweight metropolises. The available evidence certainly points to the need
for military researchers to avoid falling prey to any single form of urban
determinism.

Extending the Fundamentals of Urban Warfare

Contrary to the view expressed in Megacities and the United States Army,
megalopolises do not “def[y] the military’s ability to apply historical
methods” nor are they “fundamentally a new operating environment”
that invalidates past research.26 Even a cursory examination of the history
of industrialized urban warfare yields a set of enduring characteristics
that must be studied by today’s military professionals irrespective of the
size of any urban conurbation.27 These enduring characteristics include
a dynamic, non-linear environment defying easy military command and
22      Jonathan Kalan, “Think Again: Megacities,” Foreign Policy, no. 206 (May/June 2014): 70.
23      Ibid.; and Kotkin, “Urban Legends: Why Suburbs Not Cities are the Answer,” 128-131.
24      Kalan, “Think Again: Megacities,” 73-74.
25      Ibid.
26      Chief of Staff of the Army, Strategic Studies Group, Megacities and the United States Army, 8.
27      John Antal and Bradley Gericke, eds., City Fights: Selected Histories of Urban Combat from World
War II to Vietnam (New York: Ballantine Books, 2003); William G. Robertson and Lawrence A.
Yates, eds., Block by Block: The Challenges of Urban Operations (Fort Leavenworth, KA: US Command
and General Staff College, 2003); Michael C. Desch, ed., Soldiers in Cities: Military Operations in Urban
Terrain (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2000); Michael Dewar, War
in the Streets: The Story of Urban Combat from Calais to Khafji (Devon: David & Charles, 1992); and G. J.
Ashworth, War and the City (London: Routledge, 1991).
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control; the frequent fragmentation of combat due to the density and
scale of modern city architecture; the importance of direct-fire weapons
in clearing streets and buildings; the problem of large civilian populations in cities; the rapid absorption of troops in built-up urban areas; the
psychological-physical strain on soldiers engaged in urban fighting; and
the need for a combined arms approach to operations.28
None of these features is likely to be rendered obsolete in future
years. After all, if one accepts that a megacity is itself an extension of a
smaller or middleweight city, then, it stands to reason that urban military
operations are highly unlikely to be conjured from scratch but are themselves extensions and applications of known methods. Despite steady
technological advances in precision munitions, robotics, and thermobaric weapons, little that is revolutionary appears to be occurring in
urban warfare operational research.29 Potential operations in megacities
remain likely to differ only in scale and density from those of the past.
Megalopolises will, like all city types, continue to confront military
professionals with the time-honored challenge of “an endless variety of
structures and facilities the seizure or control of which demands esoteric
plans, programs, and procedures, since no two cities are quite alike.”30
For these reasons, most military planners of modern urban operations
have wisely focused on the role performed by troops rather than the
environment inhabited by them. It is no accident the armies that have
succeeded in modern urban warfare – from the Russians in Stalingrad
and Berlin through US forces in Manila, Hue and Fallujah to the Israelis
in Gaza – have been general purpose forces with a high degree of experience in small unit tactics and combined arms operations.31
If the past of urban warfare remains important to understand, then
the interdisciplinary research completed in the years between 1991 and
2004 represents yet another important foundation for future study. It is
worth noting that military analysts such as Paul van Riper, Roger Spiller,
Robert H. Scales, Alice Hills, and Robert C. Owen published findings
on the role of the city in future warfare.32 Much of this work occurred in
the early years of globalization and the information revolution, but it is
notable for its intellectual rigor and insight and it deserves to be consulted
closely in any project concerning the role of megacities in future conflict.
28      Evans, City Without Joy: Urban Military Operations into the 21st Century, 6-12.
29      Ian Kemp, “Urban Warfare: Complete Guide,” Supplement in Armada International 32, no.
4 (August-September 2008): 1-24; and Paolo Valpolini, “Urban Warfare: High Tech Take-Over,”
Compendium Urban Warfare Supplement, Armada International 34, no. 4 (June/July 2010): 1-24.
30      John Collins, Military Geography for Professionals and the Public (Washington, DC: National
Defense University Press, 1998), 195.
31      Daryl Press, “Urban Warfare: Options, Problems, and the Future,” Marine Corps Gazette
83, no. 4 (April 1999): 14; and Evans, “Lethal Genes: The Urban Military Imperative and Western
Strategy in the Early Twenty-First Century,” 534-535.
32      Paul van Riper, “A Concept for Future Military Operations on Urban Terrain,” Marine Corps
Gazette 81, no. 10 (October 1997), Special Insert, A-1-A-6; Roger J. Spiller, Sharp Corners: Urban
Operations at Century’s End (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, US Command and
General Staff College 1999); Robert H. Scales, Jr., Future Warfare (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army
War College, 1999); Robert H. Scales, Jr., Yellow Smoke: The Future of Land Warfare for America’s Military
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003); Robert H. Scales, Jr., “Urban Warfare: A
Soldier’s View,” Military Review 85, no. 1 (January/February 2005): 9-18.; Alice Hills, “Hearts and
Minds or Search and Destroy? Controlling Civilians in Urban Operations,” Small Wars and Insurgencies
13, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 1-24; Alice Hills, “Continuity and Discontinuity: The Grammar of Urban
Military Operations,” in War and Terrorism: Towards an Urban Geopolitics, Stephen Graham ed. (Oxford:
Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 231-246; and Alice Hills, Future War in Cities: Rethinking a Liberal Dilemma
(London: Frank Cass, 2004).
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Accordingly, some of the main ideas of the urban warfare scholars of the
1990s and early 2000s are worth re-emphasizing here.
The British scholar, Alice Hills, whose 2004 book, Future War in
Cities was a milestone in interdisciplinary urban warfare research, has
highlighted the reality that military operations in cities remain highly
diverse and heterogeneous. She argues that strategists have failed to
provide an interdisciplinary, higher-level conceptual framework for
policy makers and military practitioners:
Developing a [Western] strategic understanding of urban operations . . .
requires the reconciliation of contradictory and stressful relations, such as
those existing between the security imperatives of coercion, warfighting
and destruction on the one hand, and humanitarian relief, globalisation and
technological development on the other. And it needs the imagination to
look beyond current scenarios and interests.33

For Hills, while a “strategic grammar of urban warfare” has emerged,
a strategic logic determined by politics to guide future military operations
in cities remains elusive.34 Other analysts in the years between the fall of
the Soviet Union and the post-9/11 wars became concerned that populist notions of urban warfare would distort realistic research. Robert C.
Owen warned Western military establishments against falling prey to a
fascination with Blade Runner-style visions of “barbarian megalopolises,”
which he believed owed more to Hollywood visions of dystopia than
to hard-headed strategic analysis.35 Writing in 2001, Owen argued the
real problem facing advanced militaries confronted by urban operations
was the paradox that “the [non-state] groups most willing to fight in
cities will have the least capabilities to do so, while the ones most able
to fight large-scale urban battles will be least willing to do so.”36 Owen
drew an interesting parallel between urban operations and maritime littoral warfare which has continuing resonance. He suggested a strategic
approach to fighting in large cities might be fashioned from viewing
these conurbations as “urban archipelagos” requiring skilled maneuver,
containment, or isolation by joint forces.37
Themes of containment and maneuver were also evident in the work
of Robert H. Scales and Paul van Riper and are still useful to consider
today. As former senior military practitioners, both writers sought to
synthesize operational and strategic concerns in urban operations. Scales
advocated a highly discriminate strategy of urban warfare embracing
containment of cities and the exploitation of high-technology assets for
selective strikes and the seizure of decisive points and nodes using joint
forces.38 He suggested high-altitude unmanned aerial vehicles and precision munitions used against point targets might deplete a surrounded
city’s resources and wear down an enemy force’s will.39 Scales recom33      Hills, “Continuity and Discontinuity: The Grammar of Urban Military Operations,” 246.
34      Ibid., 244-246 and Hills, Future War in Cities: Rethinking a Liberal Dilemma, 26, 225.
35      Robert C. Owen, “Urban Warfare in the Future: Balancing Our Approach,” British Army
Review 128 (Winter 2001-2002): 25-32.
36      Ibid., 29-30
37      Ibid.
38      Robert H. Scales, “The Indirect Approach: How US Military Forces Can Avoid the Pitfalls
of Future Urban Warfare,”; and Scales, Future Warfare, 177-178.
39      Scales, Yellow Smoke: The Future of Land Warfare for America’s Military, 118-120; and Scales,
“Urban Warfare: A Soldier’s View,” 9-18.
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mended an economy of force approach remarking that, in future urban
military operations, strategic planners needed to be constantly aware of
one central truth: “America’s treasure house of close-combat soldiers is
only marginally larger than the New York City Police Department.”40
Given contemporary challenges of downsizing and fiscal austerity this
warning is arguably more relevant than ever. Similarly, van Riper, an
experienced Marine general, was wary of grinding frontal assaults in
urban warfare. He argued in favor of applying a “chameleon” style
of urban maneuver in city fighting (blended movement into the city
environment) using concepts such as “multi-spectral mobility” (the
capability to move combat power rapidly through three-dimensional
urban terrain); and “measured firepower” (integrating fire and movement within given rules of engagement).41
By the mid-2000s, as America and its allies became engulfed by
irregular conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, generic urban warfare
research declined in the United States. Much of the urban conflict
research agenda after 2004 was subsumed by the avalanche of material on
counterinsurgency, the stabilization of fragile states, and hybrid warfare
at the operational level of war.42 As a result, in 2015, the major problem
facing military thinkers when considering urban military contingencies,
namely synthesizing the variance and divergence of urban environments
into a usable strategic framework for policy makers, continues to remain
unresolved.

An Inter-Disciplinary Urban Lens

While an urban strategic lens remains underdeveloped in American
studies of armed conflict, the solution to this challenge is not to turn the
megacity into a single “unit of analysis,” but rather to study the etiology
of city development.43 Such an endeavor requires a multi-disciplinary
research program in which to situate analysis of varied cityscapes with
their interactive spatial dynamics and heterogeneous populations.
In short, the real novelty in operating in twenty-first century cities
lies less in new military methodologies for megacities than in the essential task of integrating and adapting established doctrine and concepts
into a systematic interdisciplinary strategic-level engagement with the
field of urban studies. As one major international study notes, “no single
disciplinary perspective can capture the inherent complexities of using
military force in urban areas.”44 The effort to develop an urban strategic
lens needs to embrace military history, human geography and sociology;
city planning and architectural design; municipal management procedures; criminology, policing and the employment of emergency services.
Systems-theory as outlined by analysts such as David Kilcullen and
favored in Megacities and the United States Army may have its uses. However,
such an approach represents only one avenue of inquiry for researchers
seeking to understand the military implications of the modern urban
40      Scales, “Urban Warfare: A Soldier’s View,” 10.
41      Van Riper, “A Concept for Future Military Operations on Urban Terrain,” A-1-A-6.
42      See essays in Paul B. Rich and Isabelle Duyvesteyn, eds., The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency
and Counterinsurgency (New York: Routledge, 2012).
43      Chief of Staff of the Army, Strategic Studies Group, Megacities and the United States Army, 9.
44      Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, Small Arms Survey: Guns and the City
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 188.
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environment’s mixture of demographic and topographical features. 45 It
is this unique combination which makes any city environment multidimensional – at once a social organism, a human-made physical form and
an economic system.46
The integration of urban studies into strategy needs to be conducted
with intellectual care and discrimination. Analysts need to distinguish
between high-intensity crime by urban gangs and syndicates concerned
with profit and forms of low-intensity warfare by armed urban activists driven by politics; and between mass-casualty urban terrorist acts
on the Mumbai, Nairobi, and Paris models and well-organized and
prolonged campaigns of urban warfare on the Hamas or Hizbollah
models. Military strategists also need to treat current postmodernist
ideas of a “new military urbanism” based on an ideology of Western
“orientalism” that pits “their sons against our silicon” with skepticism.47
Such work owes more to the science fiction of Judge Dredd – in which
megacities replace nations as the world’s dominant political units, and
high-technology Street Judges battle low-technology urban hordes for
supremacy – than it does to mainstream military art.48
Integrating aspects of urban studies into strategic considerations has
the potential to improve our knowledge in at least three areas relevant to
future warfare: examining cities as strategic sites, understanding global
and regional city variations, and deriving procedures for city operations
from municipal principles of security control. In examining cities as
strategic sites, military practitioners and policy makers need to begin to
view metropolises as human conurbations reflecting all the complexities
of large-scale urban planning. In effect, to master cities, the military
strategist must assume much of the mindset of an urban planning
executive. In city operations, control of civil infrastructure from water
purification and electricity through garbage removal to securing medical
infrastructure and public transport are all invested with strategic significance.49 If city operations are to be a common future environment
for American and allied forces, then an urban strategic lens must be
developed, which can help determine policy choices on the practicality
and size of interventions in cities, formulate rules of engagement, and
provide advice on the roles military forces might play in those urban
contingencies.
The second area of relevant research, namely, assessing the global
and regional variation between cities, has the potential to put megacities into a balanced strategic context. As already noted earlier, a diverse
web of middleweight cities is likely to develop in regions such as Asia,
Latin America, and Africa as a counterpoint to sprawling, ill-governed
megalopolises. Such a process represents a complex pattern of urbanization and requires the closest strategic analysis by defense specialists. In
45      Chief of Staff of the Army, Strategic Studies Group, Megacities and the United States Army,
10-11; David Kilcullen, “The City as a System: Future Conflict and Urban Resilience,” The Fletcher
Forum of World Affairs 36, no. 2 (Summer 2012): 19-39.
46      Max Neiman, “Urban Operations: Social Meaning, the Urban Built Form and Economic
Function,” in Desch, Soldiers in Cities: Military Operations on Urban Terrain, 139-147.
47      Stephen Graham, Cities Under Siege: The New Military Urbanism (London: Verso, 2010), passim..
48      Mike Butcher, The A-Z of Judge Dredd: The Complete Encyclopedia from Aaron Aardvark to Zachary
Zziiz (London: St Martin’s Press, 1995).
49      Evans, City Without Joy: Urban Military Operations into the 21st Century, 28-30. Graduate Institute
of International Studies, Geneva, Small Arms Survey 2007: Guns and the City, 196-197.
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this area, military researchers can draw profitably on the work of a range
of urban theorists. The latter include Robert Neuwirth and Thomas
Sieverts whose work on “shadow cities” and the Zwischenstadt or “cities
without cities” respectively highlights the replacement of many centralised urban conglomerations by clustered “city webs” in a checkerboard
of dense enclaves and social networks.50 If the city is to be understood
accurately as a future strategic environment, then the US Army must
invest in research that distinguishes between the global city of influence,
the megacity of sprawl, and the emerging middleweight city and between
peri-urban, semi-urban, and inner-urban forms of human habitation.
A third area requiring military attention is a study of municipal principles of security control. Evidence suggests in decentralized conditions
or in urban areas lacking governance, military efforts to control violence
are best concentrated on creating municipal or community-level forms
of security.51 For command and control purposes, military professionals
can gain insights into cities by studying a law-enforcement typology of
coercion, compliance, and voluntarism at local community level. Such
a typology reveals control methods ranging from coercive “gated communities” and forcible disarmament; through compliance measures that
involve community policing; to voluntarism involving amnesties and
citizen neighborhood watch schemes.52

Conclusion

The modern city remains the least understood of potential conflict
environments, and strategic theory clearly lags behind military practice.
However, classifying one form of urbanization in the form of megacities
as primary strategic sites for future American military intervention is not
viable. Indeed, such an approach may turn out to be misleading because
global urbanization is highly diverse and is, in fact, producing far more
middleweight cities than megalopolises. In the developing world, some
of these vibrant middleweight cities with their migration clusters and
economic hubs may come to assume more strategic importance than
stagnant megacities with declining populations. Moreover, having just
experienced over a decade of war, the US Army is now entering a period
of downsizing and reorganization driven by the demands of domestic
fiscal austerity. The American profession of arms therefore needs to be
wary of replacing the controversial experiment of population-centric
counterinsurgency with the equally untested hypothesis of populationcentric megacity warfare.
The quickest way to degrade American combat power will be to
deploy large numbers of troops into a megacity without a thorough
examination of how the complex dynamics of global urbanization are
likely to unfold.
When it comes to cities, large and small, security analysts need to
understand there will always be a natural set of tensions between the
general purpose role of modern landpower and the unique features of

50      Robert Neuwirth, Shadow Cities: A Billion Squatters, A New Urban World (London: Routledge,
2005), passim; and Thomas Sieverts, Cities Without Cities: An Interpretation of the Zwischenstadt (London:
Spot Press, 2003), passim.
51      Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, Small Arms Survey 2007: Guns and the
City, 178-188.
52      Ibid.
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urban environments stemming from the combination of demography
and topography.
There are many diverse kinds of urban contingencies to consider
in a wide-range of urban localities: from all-out combat operations
through humanitarian relief and the creation of protected enclaves and
evacuation corridors to littoral operations. Given such diversity, military
professionals need to be careful they do not pursue any single avenue
of research that might prove to be a policy cul-de-sac. A close study of
the phenomenon of urbanization as a future conflict environment is
justified, but a convincing case for the megacity as a primary strategic
environment for US forces has yet to be made.

